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BY
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ABSTRACT

The National Security Agency's bulk data collection programs disclosed in 2013 suggest a new model of surveillance. This "predictive
surveillance" model will apply the emerging field of predictive analytics
to the vast datasets in the hands of third parties. Unlike traditional surveillance, predictive surveillance will not begin by targeting individuals
based on particularized suspicion. Instead, predictive surveillance will
first collect and analyze all available data to find patterns that could predict future events. In light of the NSA's emphasis on data analysis and its
existing stores of telephone and Internet communications metadata, it
seems inevitable that the government will eventually advocate for predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investigations. This Article contends
that the existing framework of surveillance regulation cannot adapt to
predictive surveillance because the existing framework presumes that
surveillance begins with targeting. The Article next assesses whether
predictive surveillance could comply with the Fourth Amendment. After
rejecting arguments that the Fourth Amendment should not apply to information gathered from third parties or in public spaces, the Article proposes a narrow basis for authorizing predictive surveillance. The initial
data collection would be reasonable under the Supreme Court's balancing approach in domestic security investigations and under the Court's
approval of suspicionless searches in its special needs cases. This approach, however, would only uphold surveillance used for antiterrorism
investigations, rather than ordinary law enforcement purposes. Finally,
the Article proposes a new regulatory framework that postpones the assessment of particularized suspicion, requires prior judicial approval of
the initial data collection and analysis, limits use of the database to antiterrorism investigations, and imposes substantial oversight and transparency.
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INTRODUCTION

I started work on this Article after Edward Snowden disclosed the
existence of the National Security Agency's (NSA) bulk collection of
metadata about our domestic and international telephone calls. I assumed
that, with a comprehensive archive of telephone metadata available, the
NSA was analyzing the entire database for patterns that could indicate
potential terrorist activity. Subsequent reports, however, left me feeling
vaguely disappointed in the NSA. It turned out that the NSA's searches
began with specific telephone numbers that they believed to be associated with terrorist activity and expanded out several degrees of separation
to encompass people who had communicated with the target and people
who had communicated with those people.' I was disappointed for two
reasons. First, the NSA might be able to do far more with this vast store
of data. And second, the NSA could have accomplished these targeted
searches nearly as efficiently by seeking orders targeted at each of the
telephone numbers they believed to be associated with terrorist activity,
thus accomplishing the same goal with far less harm to privacy and the
public trust. Recent reports revealed that the NSA has found it more and
more challenging to collect the metadata. Part of the challenge has been
the lack of a protocol to exclude the cell site location data embedded in
the telephone metadata from cell phone providers.2 As a result, the percentage of metadata collected had fallen to less than 30% in early 2014.3
Regardless of the current practical or political limitations, the bulk
telephone metadata program and others like it point to a new model of
surveillance. This "predictive surveillance" model will apply the emerging field of predictive analytics to the vast datasets in the hands of third
parties. Unlike traditional surveillance, predictive surveillance will not
begin by targeting individuals based on particularized suspicion. Instead,
predictive surveillance will first collect and analyze all available data to
find patterns that could predict future events. In light of the NSA's emphasis on data analysis and its existing stores of telephone and Internet
communications metadata, one can envision a strong temptation to use
1. These are the first two "hops" in the NSA's chaining analysis. In "very few instances," the
NSA would make a third "hop." PRESIDENT'S REVIEw GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS
TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 102-03 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12rgfinal report.pdf.
2.
See Ellen Nakashima, NSA Is Collecting Less than 30 Percent of US. Call Data, Officials
Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
2014/02/07/234a0e9e-8fad-1 1e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da-story.html.
Id. The intelligence agency's goal, however, remains 100% collection. Id.
3.
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predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investigations. This Article contends that existing surveillance regulation framework cannot adapt to
predictive surveillance because the existing framework presumes that
surveillance begins with targeting. The Article proposes a new regulatory
framework that postpones the assessment of particularized suspicion,
requires prior judicial approval of the initial data collection and analytics,
limits use of the analytics to antiterrorism investigations, and imposes
substantial oversight and transparency.
Part I describes the convergence of two important phenomena: the
explosion of data about all aspects of our lives and the emerging field of
predictive analytics. Viktor Mayer-Schanberger and Kenneth Cukier
describe how these phenomena have led to the rise of "Big Data" in their
recent book by the same title.4 In the age of Big Data, statisticians need
not rely on sampling datasets to analyze past behavior. Instead, with
complete datasets at their disposal, they may use a variety of new predictive techniques capable of building highly accurate predictive models.
Predictive analytics are already in widespread use in the private and government sectors. They have been used to predict such diverse outcomes
as when a machine will fail, which manhole covers are at highest risk of
explosion, and where flu outbreaks are emerging. 5
Part II contrasts traditional surveillance with predictive surveillance
and uses the NSA's recently disclosed bulk collection programs to illustrate the differences. Under the traditional model, law enforcement first
decides on a subject to target. For example, in the bulk telephone
metadata collection program, the NSA queried the database with a telephone number associated with a foreign terrorist organization. Thus, the
process begins with particularized suspicion about a subject, and the surveillance targets information about that subject. Under the predictive
surveillance model, however, the process would be quite different. The
NSA's first step would be to analyze all of the telephone metadata in
order to identify patterns associated with past terrorist activity. If meaningful patterns emerged, only then would the NSA move to targeted surveillance by investigating subjects whose metadata corresponded with
patterns correlated with past terrorist activity. Part II also details how the
government already uses predictive surveillance to predict high-crime
locations and detect fraud, as well as how researchers have used predictive analytics to predict terrorist and insurgent activity overseas. Finally,
Part II explains how the NSA's current bulk collection programs set the
stage for predictive surveillance.
Part III explains that existing surveillance regulation framework
cannot adapt to predictive surveillance because the existing framework
4.
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 7-8, 11-12, 15 (2013).
5.
See infra Part I; see also MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 1-2.
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depends on assessing whether the initial targeting decision is based on
sufficient particularized suspicion. For example, in the law enforcement
context, the Fourth Amendment presumes a search in which there is
probable cause to believe the subject is involved in criminal activity.
Even in foreign intelligence investigations, which are exempt from the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the courts still consider
"whether the protections afforded to the privacy rights of targeted persons are reasonable in light of' the government's interest in preventing
6
foreign terrorism. The statutory limits on surveillance also begin by assessing the targeting decision. The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act prohibits wiretapping absent probable cause that the target has committed or will commit a crime 7 and prohibits compelled disclosure of
Internet Service Provider (ISP) records unless those records are "relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." 8 Similarly, to approve
a wiretap under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a court
must find probable cause that the target is "an agent of a foreign power." 9
All of the foregoing tests presume that the government has already targeted someone specific.
Part III also explains why the government should not try to shoehorn predictive surveillance into the existing regulatory framework. First,
applying the old framework to predictive surveillance could mean that
predictive surveillance is rejected because of the lack of particularized
suspicion. If predictive surveillance has any value as an intelligence tool,
we should not let a lack of imagination about surveillance regulation
deny those potential benefits. Second, given the potential of predictive
surveillance, there is a significant risk that the government would bend or
even break the rules in the existing framework in order to reap those
benefits. In that case, predictive public surveillance would not be subject
to safeguards necessary to deal with the comprehensive datasets it requires. By way of illustration, such a shoehorning appears to have taken
place with regard to the bulk collection of telephone metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.' 0 Because it was authorized through
a statute never designed for bulk collection, the program operated in total
secrecy-until the Snowden disclosures-with inadequate congressional
oversight, minimal judicial approval, and no meaningful opportunity for
appellate review.
Part IV considers whether the Fourth Amendment would prohibit
use of predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investigations. For data
6.

In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2012).
7.
8.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012).
9.
10.

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept

and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
272, 287-88 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)).

§ 215,

115 Stat.
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collected from private entities, such as telecommunications providers, the
government would try to justify the collection under the third-party doctrine. And for data collected in public spaces, such as license plate readers, the government would argue that individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in public spaces. This Article argues, however,
that the courts should reject those arguments and hold that the initial data
collection constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Article next argues that this initial data collection would nevertheless be reasonable under the relaxed Fourth Amendment requirements in domestic security investigations under the Keith case," as well
as under the U.S. Supreme Court's approval of suspicionless searches in
its special needs cases. The initial collection, however, could only survive under these theories if the program were limited to antiterrorism
investigations, as opposed to ordinary law enforcement uses.
Finally, Part V proposes the elements of a regulatory scheme for
predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investigations. First, the government would have to seek an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for the initial collection. The FISC could only issue
such an order if the government made a Daubert-style showing that the
proposed statistical techniques were scientifically valid and likely to
yield a meaningful result. This examination of the collection decision
would take the place of the traditional evaluation of the targeting decision. Second, the government would have to report to the FISC on the
results of its data analysis and would have to seek an additional order
from the FISC to investigate subjects whose current data matched the
prior patterns. That is where the review of the targeting decision would
take place. Third, the government could not use the raw database for any
purpose other than the antiterrorism investigation. Fourth, the framework
would mandate the most advanced security possible against outside intrusion and would impose substantial penalties for internal misuse of the
data. Finally, the framework would impose substantial judicial and legislative oversight as well as public transparency.
I. BIG DATA AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS
The term "predictive surveillance" envisions surveillance that gathers and analyzes all available data-for example, the metadata for all
telephone calls from the major telecommunications carriers. 12 Gathering
and analyzing all the data, rather than merely gathering a sample, is the

11.

United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

12.
See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS
OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 8-11
(2014), available at

https://www.pclob.gov/Library/215-Report on theTelephone RecordsProgram.pdf.
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trend that Mayer-Schdnberger and Cukier explore in their recent book,
Big Data.13
A 2012 New York Times article about Big Data described the "drift
toward data-driven discovery and decision-making" in many different
fields.14 Gary King, director of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, called the Big Data movement a "revolution." 5 King continued,
"[T]he march of quantification, made possible by enormous new sources
of data, will sweep through academia, business and government. There is
no area that is going to be untouched."l 6
Why all the hype? Mayer-Schbnberger and Cukier use the term Big
Data as shorthand for the convergence of two important developments.
The first development is the data explosion itself. Data are multiplying at
an almost unimaginable rate, 17 and new tools are emerging to convert
previously unquantifiable phenomena into digital data. In many cases,
we are able to process all of the data regarding a given phenomenon.
This data explosion provides the datasets needed for the second development: the emerging field of predictive analytics. This methodology
predicts future behavior based on the patterns that emerge from vast datasets.' 8 For centuries, practical limitations made it impossible for scientists to collect observations concerning every member of a population. So
statisticians devised sophisticated techniques to (1) draw representative
samples from the population, and (2) extrapolate from an analysis of the
sample to an analysis of the population. When reporting their results,
statisticians use a lower-case "n" to indicate the size of their sample and
an upper-case "N" to indicate the size of the population. As MayerSchonberger and Cukier explain, in a play on these statistical abbreviations, in Big Data, n=all.19 Big Data researchers need not rely on samples. Instead, they use new analytical techniques to find patterns in observations of the entire population and then use those patterns to predict
future behavior.
Gathering "all the data" makes new predictive techniques possible.
Evidence of causation has long been the touchstone of scientific research. With predictive analytics, however, causation is far less relevant.
By using predictive analytics to study large datasets with many variables,
13.
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 12-13.
Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SRI.
14.
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
15.
16.
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
For example, as recently as 2000, only one quarter of the world's stored information was
17.
in digital form. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 9. The rest were stored in analog
form, "on paper, film, vinyl LP records, magnetic cassette tapes, and the like." Id. But by 2007, only
7% of the world's stored data were analog; the rest were digital. Id. at 8-9. By 2013, the digital
analog spread had widened to 98% digital versus 2% analog. Id. at 9.
18.
ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY,
LIE, OR DIE 11 (2013).
19.
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 26.
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analysts can build extremely accurate predictive models based on strong
correlations in the data, regardless of why those correlations may exist.20
This technique can reveal correlations one might not have imagined if
one were looking for causation.
For example, predictive analytics can generate models that predict
when a given mechanical device, like a motor or a bridge, will fail. The
models are based on vast amounts of data from sensors monitoring patterns in the data that the devices emit, "such as heat, vibration, stress, and
sound." 2 1 It is far less important to know why the device may fail than it
is to know, before the fact, that it will probably fail.22 Eric Siegel's Predictive Analytics gives us many examples of what predictive analytics
can show us. 2 3 "Suicide bombers do not buy life insurance."24 Crime
rises after upset losses in college football. 25 "Phone card sales predict
[massacres] in the Congo." 26 Mac users spend "up to 30 percent more
than [PC] users when booking" online hotel reservations. 27 In these cases, government and businesses use correlations to predict future behavior.
Predictive analytics capitalizes on the proliferation of digital technologies and the fact that data can invariably be combined with other
data and put to new uses. Often these secondary uses yield the most valuable large-scale data analyses. For example, a team of Columbia University statisticians set out to help solve New York City's "exploding
28
manhole[]" cover problem. A few hundred times a year, fires would
break out beneath manhole covers, sometimes sending the heavy castiron covers several stories high. 29 Con Edison's random manhole inspections were ineffective in heading off the problem. 30 The team from Columbia gathered every kind of data imaginable. Various types of inconsistent data existed in handwritten form dating back to the late 1800s. 32
After the team had gathered all the data and written computer algorithms
to interpret the data, patterns emerged. Using data from the late 1800s
through 2008-data that were never intended to predict manhole cover
explosions-the team sorted through 106 predictors and produced a
model in which "[t]he top 10 percent of manhole [covers] on their
20.
21.

Id. at 6-7, 13-14.
Id. at 58.

22.

Id. at 59. For a comprehensive discussion of predictive analytics, see SIEGEL, supra note

23.

SIEGEL, supra note 18, at 80-86.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id at 85.
Id at 86.
Id.
Id at 81.

28.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 68.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 68-70.
Id at 68.
Id at 69.

18.
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["watch"] list contained . .. 44 percent of [all of] the [covers] that ended
up having severe incidents" in 2009.34
Another example of unexpected uses involved the large amounts of
location data that cellular phone providers have about their subscribers.
One researcher "combined location data of prepaid cell phone subscribers in Africa with the amount of money [the subscribers] spent when they
topped off their accounts." 3 5 This unexpected combination of data yielded the surprising finding that slums in Africa can "act as economic
springboards" for residents' socioeconomic status. 36
The next Part examines how the rise of Big Data and predictive analytics could give rise to a new surveillance model-predictive surveillance-that does not require targeting specific individuals.
II.

THE ROLE OF TARGETING IN TRADITIONAL SURVEILLANCE AND
PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE

A. TraditionalSurveillance Begins by Targeting Based on Particularized
Suspicion
Under the traditional surveillance model, the government first decides to target a particular subject based on some degree of particularized
suspicion. In some cases, that particularized suspicion may be quite high.
For example, when criminal investigators pursue a wiretap under the
Wiretap Act, they must demonstrate to a court that there is probable
cause to believe that the interception will reveal evidence of a felony
offense listed in section 2516 . Similarly, when criminal investigators
install a GPS device to track a suspect's car, they must first obtain a warrant based on probable cause to believe that the tracking will reveal evidence of a crime.3 8
In other cases, the particularized suspicion can be significantly lower. For example, under the Stored Communications Act, the government
may compel an ISP to produce subscriber information based on "specific
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the . .. records or other information sought[] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." 39 And when foreign intelligence investigators seek a court order to intercept electronic communications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, they need only

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 68-70.
Id at 91.
Id
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(b) (2012).
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 954 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
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show probable cause to believe that "the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." 4 0
At first blush, the NSA's recently disclosed mass-surveillance programs may appear to represent this new surveillance model. At their
core, however, they employ traditional, targeting-based techniques. For
example, since 2006 the government has relied on Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act to collect metadata on telephone calls made to or
from telephone numbers in the United States.4 1 This metadata includes
the "originating and terminating telephone number," the time of the call,
and the duration of the call, but does not include the call's contents.4 2
The program stored metadata on U.S. phone calls for five years. 43 Although the program collected 'closer to 100' percent" of all call records
in 2006, as time passed the percentage of phone records collected fell
below 30% because the NSA cold not keep up with cell phone use.44
Minimization procedures drafted by the Attorney General limit the
circumstances under which the NSA can search the telephone metadata
that it collects.4 5 A search may only begin with a specific identifier, like a
telephone number, that the NSA suspects is associated with one of the

40.

50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A) (2012).

41.
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12, at 42. The bulk telephone
metadata program began in 2001, after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Id. at 37. From 2001 until
2006, the program proceeded without any legislative or judicial authorization. See id. Instead, President Bush issued a presidential authorization in October 2001, based on a finding of an extraordinary
emergency because of the September II terrorist attacks. Id. That authorization directed the bulk
collection of .'metadata[]' about telephone and Internet communications," as well as the collection
of the contents of international communications (later known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program).
Id. President Bush renewed the authorization every thirty to sixty days. Id. After the New York
Times reported on the previously secret Terrorist Surveillance Program in December 2005, the
administration became concerned that the bulk collection of telephone metadata would also be
exposed. Id at 40. In May 2006, the administration obtained authority from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court to conduct bulk collection of telephone metadata under Section 215 of the USA

PATRIOT Act. Id at 40, 42.
42. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *1 n.2 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court noted that "[tihe sole purpose of this production is to obtain foreign
intelligence information in support of [redacted] individual authorized investigations to protect
against international terrorism and concerning various international terrorist organizations." Id. at * 1.
43.
Scott Shane, N.S.A. Violated Rules on Use of Phone Logs, Intelligence Court Found in

2009, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, at A14.
44.
Ellen Nakashima, NSA Is Collecting Less Than 30 Percent of U.S. Call Data, Officials
Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-is-

collecting-less-than-30-percent-of-us-call-data-officials-say/2014/02/07/234a0e9e-8fad-l I e3-b46a5a3d0d2130da story.html. According "to current and former U.S. officials," the NSA was unable to
keep up with expanding cellphone use for several reasons. Id. First, the NSA must "prepare its
database to handle . . . cellphone data," which contain "different data (] than land-line calls" and
often "contain geolocation data, which the NSA" may not receive. Id. And second, NSA resources
were diverted from preparing its databases during 2009 by review and compliance issues arising
from breaches documented by the FISC and from responses to congressional inquiries in the wake of
the Snowden disclosures. Id. Nevertheless, the officials indicated that the government is attempting
to restore collection to previous levels. Id.

45.

50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B), (c)(1), (g)(1) (2012).
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46

terrorist organizations under investigation. In 2012 the "NSA queried
288 unique identifiers" that, in the NSA's view, met the requisite "reasonable, articulable suspicion" standard for association with a terrorist
-47
organization.
The NSA uses the vast database of telephone metadata to perform
what it calls "link analysis." 48 First, the NSA gathers data about the telephone numbers that have been in contact with the suspected terrorist's
number-the first hop. 49 Next, in most cases, the NSA adds numbers in
contact with those first hop numbers-the second hop.50 And finally, in
very few instances, the NSA adds numbers in contact with those second
hop numbers-the third hop.' If each number at issue "called or was
called by 100 phone numbers over the course of' five years, then the first
hop would produce a list of 100 phone numbers, the second hop would
"produce a list of 10,000 phone numbers," and the third hop would produce a list of 1,000,000 phone numbers.5 2
This link analysis is intended to identify networks of terror cells.
The Obama administration claims that NSA analysis of these searches
"has generated and continues to generate investigative leads for ongoing
efforts by the FBI and other agencies to identify and track terrorist operatives, associates, and facilitators."54 Yet the White House's own NSA
review panel concluded that metadata "was not essential to preventing
attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using
conventional section 215 orders."
The post-Snowden modifications that President Obama proposed
for the Section 215 bulk collection program reaffirm that the Section 215
program is traditional, target-based surveillance. First, the President proposed allowing the metadata to be held by a third party or by the telecommunications companies themselves.
Second, the President proposed limiting the number of hops from the target's number from three to
46.

1, at 98.
47.

PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note

Id. at 98, 102.

48.
Charlie Savage, Extended Ruling by Secret Court Backs Collection of Phone Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted).
49.

PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note

1, at 102.
50.
Id. at 103.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.

Savage, supra note 48.

54.

ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER

SECTION

215

OF

THE

USA

PATRIOT

ACT

4

(2013),

available

at

https://info.publicintelligence.net/DoJ-NSABulkCollection.pdf.
55.

PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note

1, at 104.
Id. at 17; see also Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet:
56.
Review of U.S. Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/01/17/fact-sheet-review-us-signals-intelligence.
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two. 57 Third, the President directed the Attorney General to develop a
procedure with the FISC so that the database could not be queried without a judicial order. These proposed reforms confirm that the program
is a traditional, targeting-based effort to identify the people with whom a
specific subject has been talking, rather than a broad, pattern-based analysis. Thus, despite the "n=all" aspect of the bulk collection, the actual
queries target specific identifiers about which the NSA has particularized
suspicion.
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has run a similar, although
less publicized, program in cooperation with AT&T.59 The DEA's Hemisphere Project searches decades of AT&T telephone records in an effort
to catch drug dealers.60 Drug dealers routinely switch phones or phone
numbers to evade investigation. 61 They use so-called "'burner' phones"
to make calls to their subordinates and discard the phones before police
can track their behavior.62 The DEA uses the drug dealer's past calls
63
from his old number to identify his associates. 6 The DEA then uses the
pattern of calls from his associates to identify the drug dealer's new
number. 4 The program places DEA employees in AT&T offices so that
the DEA can quickly execute subpoenas for phone records searchesoften in as little as an hour.65 The records available to the DEA include
phone numbers, time and duration of calls, and the location from which
the call was made.66 Thus, like the NSA's bulk telephone metadata program, the Hemisphere program is a traditional, targeting-based surveillance technique.
B. Predictive Surveillance Begins Without Any Targetingor Particularized Suspicion
Under the predictive surveillance model, instead of targeting particular suspects, the government would instead analyze data to find patterns
that correlate with past terrorist activity. Then, based on those patterns,
the government could use traditional targeted surveillance to investigate
similar patterns in the emerging data. Although there is no indication that
the NSA has plans to use predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investi57.

Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 56.

58.

Id.

59.
The program is likely less publicized because the government does not engage in the
initial step of bulk collection of everyone's telephone metadata. Instead, it leaves the metadata in the
hands of AT&T and queries the data as needed. Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use

Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2013, at Al.
60.
Id
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Mike Levine, DEA Program Puts Phone Company Inside Government Offices, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 1, 2013, 9:06 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/09/dea-program-putsphone-company-inside-govemment-offices/.

64.
65.

Id.
Id.

66.

Shane & Moynihan, supranote 59.
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gations, both federal and local government agencies have used predictive
analytics in other contexts.
1. Government Has Used Predictive Analytics for Crime Prevention, Regulatory Enforcement, and Fraud Detection
Police departments have turned to predictive analytics to target their
resources at specific areas at high risk for crime. For example, in Memphis, police operate a program called Blue CRUSH (an acronym for
Crime Reduction Utilizing Statistical History). The program "provides
police officers with relatively precise areas of interest in terms of locality
(a few blocks) and time (a few hours during a particular day of the
week)." 68 This allows the police to better target their limited resources. 69
Police departments in Los Angeles, Chicago, Santa Cruz, and Vineland,
New Jersey, have used similar techniques to predict crime location. 70
Police in Richmond, Virginia use predictive analytics to correlate crime
with variables like payday for large employers and the dates of large
sporting events and concerts.
New York City recently used predictive analytics to make efficient
use of city inspectional services investigators faced with an avalanche of
72
complaints about illegal apartment conversions.72 These illegal conversions involve dividing apartments into many smaller units and often
cause unsafe conditions such as fire hazards.
Predictive analytics
helped the city triage the overwhelming number of complaints and focus
on the ones that posed the most risk. Previously, only 13% of inspections
had found conditions severe enough to merit a vacate order. 74 After using
the predictive analytics, that rate rose to 70%.7
The government also uses predictive analytics to identify likely instances of fraud. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for example, analyzes its data to rank tax returns for audits based on the likelihood of tax
76
evasion. Its system enabled the IRS to find "25 times more tax evasion,
without increasing the number of investigations."
The Department of
Defense Finance and Accounting Service used data analysis to detect
67.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 158.

68.
69.

Id.
Id.

70.
71.

SIEGEL, supra note 18, at 51.
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 158.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 186.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Id.

76.
SIEGEL, supra note 18, at tbl.5.
77.
Id.;
Government:
Our
Work,
ELDER
RESEARCH,
INC.,
http://datamininglab.com/solutions/industries/govemment (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) ("ERI data
miners built predictive models for a large government revenue agency to find tax refund fraud which
led to a 25-fold increase in the hit rate of fraud found per analyst hour. Based on these highly successful results, the predictive models built by ERI were deployed ahead of schedule to all 10 frauddetection centers.").
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97% of known fraud cases. And the United States Postal Service uses
data analysis to rank instances of suspected contract fraud in order to
direct its internal investigations.
Similarly, a private firm called Xoom detected a criminal group's
credit card fraud scheme by analyzing all international money transfer
data.80 The firm "noticed a slightly higher than average number of Discover Card transactions originating from New Jersey. 'It saw a pattern
where there shouldn't have been a pattern."' 8 ' The firm detected this
pattern by analyzing all of the data; mere sampling may have missed the
pattern. 82

2. Predictive Analytics Have Successfully Predicted Terrorist and
Insurgent Activity
A leader in the predictive analytics field is the Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics (LCCD), part of the University of Maryland's Institute for Advanced Computer Studies. 83 The LCCD developed
a model to predict the successors of captured terrorist leaders. The system is called Shaping Terrorist Organisation Network Efficacy
(STONE). 84 The system relies on data about individual terrorists and
connections between terrorists. The individual terrorist data include their
rank, role, and expertise at planning or executing attacks. The connections include attending the same school or training camp, involvement in
the same attack, or attending the same meeting.s Developers tested the
system on leaders removed from several terrorist groups, including alQaida. The STONE system usually returned three or four possible replacements, and in 80% of the cases, the replacement was one of
86
STONE's suggestions.
The LCCD also created a model that can predict future attacks by a
particular terrorist group. "The analytic technologies that the University
of Maryland team applied to terrorism are similar to data mining analytics commonly used by Amazon and big box retailers to predict customer

78.

79.
80.
81.
82.

SIEGEL, supra note 18, at tbl.5.

Id.
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 27-28.

Id. (quoting John Kunze, CEO of Xoom).
Id.

83.
Welcome to the LCCD,
LAB. FOR COMPUTATIONAL CULTURAL DYNAMICS,
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/research/LCCD/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
84.
V.S. Subrahmanian, Introducing the Software That Can Predict New Leaders of Terror
Groups,
THE
OBSERVER
(London),
Sept.
15,
2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/I 5/al-qaida-terrorist-leader.
85.
Id; see also Mark Rockwell, Who's the Next Head of Hezbollah? New Platform Has
Some Predictions, FCW (Aug. 27, 2013), http://fcw.com/artices/2013/08/27/stone-predictiveanalytics.aspx.
86.
Subrahmanian, supra note 84; see also Rockwell, supra note 85.
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activity." 87 The model relies on data on 770 variables from more than 20
years of the group's activities. 8 The data come from "a variety of primary sources including open-source news articles from local magazines and
newspapers, and scholarly publications on terrorism in South Asia."89
LCCD's algorithms found that there was an 88% chance of the terrorist
group LeT attacking local security forces if "between five and 24 LeT
operatives had been arrested and LeT operatives were on trial in either
India or Pakistan." 90 The program generated hundreds of similar rules,
including "predictors for terrorist attacks on civilians, professional security forces, transportation centers, security installations, and symbolic or
tourist locations." 91
Predictive analytics also helped predict improvised explosive device
attacks in Iraq in the early 2000s. While working on the legal team prosecuting Saddam Hussein, attorney Mike Flowers needed to ensure that
witnesses brought into the Green Zone avoided the all too common IED
attacks. 92 Based on data from intelligence analysis about field reports and
past IED attacks, Flowers's team predicted the safest routes into the
Green Zone on a given day.93
The programs above involve either information already in the agency's possession or information available from public sources. Predictive
surveillance programs, in contrast, would first need to engage in largescale data collection in order to gather the data to be analyzed. With that
in mind, this Article turns next to how the NSA's existing bulk-data collection programs hint at what true predictive surveillance programs
would look like.
3. The NSA's Bulk Collection Programs Preview the Potential of
Predictive Surveillance
The bulk collection of telephone metadata under Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act suggests how the NSA might someday conduct predictive surveillance. By collecting telephone metadata for all calls originating in or terminating in the United States, the NSA has created a pro94
totypical Big Data dataset in which n=all. To conduct predictive surveillance using this dataset, the NSA's first step would be to identify past
incidents of known terrorist activity. These need not be terrorist attacks;
they could also be instances of entry into the country, recruitment efforts,
87.
Neal Ungerleider, A Computer Program That Predicts TerroristAttacks, FAST COMPANY
(Sept. 17, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/1680540/a-computer-program-thatpredicts-terrorist-attacks.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

92.

MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 185.

93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 26.
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meetings of known terrorist cells, or preparations for attacks. The next
step would be to analyze all of the telephone metadata in order to identify patterns that correlate with past foreign terrorist activity. If such patterns emerged, the NSA could then search emerging data for similar patterns. Only after finding a significant pattern in the emerging data would
the government move to targeted surveillance, most likely by tasking the
FBI to investigate potential targets whose telephone metadata formed
part of the emerging pattern.
Another NSA program, code named Co-Traveler, hints at how the
NSA could engage in predictive surveillance-although for now, this
program remains a traditional, targeting-based program. The NSA collects billions of cellular phone location records per day by tapping into
the telephone links of major telecommunications providers, including
some providers in the United States. 95 The NSA then uses sophisticated
analytics to find "co-travelers-unknown associates who might be traveling with or meeting up with a known target." 96
To find these co-travelers, the NSA uses a suite of tools called "CoTraveler Analytics." 97 For example, one tool "examines movements on a
global scale in order to identify new suspects who might have
shared . . similar movements with a person of interest, such as passing
through the same location within a l hour window."98 Another tool uses
the "average travel velocity between pairs of travelers in order to determine whether it would be practically possible for the travelers to have
traveled together." 99 Still another searches for "when targets might have
been seen in the same city as the target over a given time frame."'a
One technique in particular signals the potential of predictive surveillance. The "DSD Co-Travel Analytic" analyzes location information
"to predict potential points of intersection-projecting into the future all
the individuals that may 'cross paths' with a given target. Plans are also
underway to identify targets based on suspicious behaviors such as iden-

95.
Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide,
Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/

04/5492873a-5cf2-l1 le3-bc56-c6ca94801 facstory.html.
96.
How
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NSA
Is
Tracking
People

Right

Now,

WASH.

POST,

http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/how-the-nsa-is-tracking-people-right-now/634/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2015). For a video illustrating how the NSA identifies unknown associates traveling
with the target, see Osman Malik, How the NSA Uses Cellphone Tracking to Find and 'Develop'
Targets, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/national/

2013/12/04/d9114d52-5dlf-I le3-95c2-13623eb2b0el video.html.
97.
Ashkan Soltani & Barton Gellman, New Documents Show How the NSA Infers Relationships
Based on
Mobile
Location Data,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
10,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/new-documents-show-how-theNSA-infers-relationships-based-on-mobile-location-data/.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.

100.

Id
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tifying mobiles that are turned off right before two people meet."'0 1 This
planned method is an example of a surveillance technique that is not
premised on targeting a specific individual. Instead, the analysis identifies a behavioral pattern that the NSA believes may be associated with
wrongdoing and then searches the data for that pattern.
With the rise of today's surveillance society,1 02 the government has
vast datasets at its disposal for predictive surveillance. First, government
could collect the vast troves of data that we have shared with third parties, such as GPS location from our phones and cars,' 0 3 the content of our
telephone calls and emails,'0 metadata about our telephone calls and
Internet communications, 105 and mobile app activity 06 from telecommunications and ISPs. Second, government could collect raw data itself by,
for example, imaging our license plates or our faces, whether from fixed
video cameras, moving police cars, or airborne drones. The groundwork
for this type of data collection already exists. Police departments across
the country have already deployed automatic license plate reading systems, and California has become the first state to adopt digital license
plates. 0 7 The city of Boston recently tested "situational awareness" software that used existing security cameras to monitor the crowds at an outdoor music festival.' 0 8 Situational awareness software can monitor for
101.
Id. For the NSA White Paper describing the entire suite of Co-Traveler Analytics, see
NAT'L SEC. ADMIN., SUMMARY OF DNR AND DNI CO-TRAVEL ANALYTICS (2012), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/888734/cotraveler-trackingredacted.pdf.
102.
Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem, 65

S.C. L. REV. 373, 390-91 (2013).
103.
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, You ARE BEING TRACKED: How LICENSE PLATE READERS
ARE BEING USED TO RECORD AMERICANS' MOVEMENTS 7-11 (2013), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf (reporting on governmental
and private industry use of license plate readers); Ellen Nakashima, NSA Had Test Project to Collect
Data on Cellphone Locations, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2013, at A15 (reporting testimony by General
Keith Alexander, NSA Director, about 2010 NSA test project gathering "'samples' of cellphone
location data 'to test the ability of its systems to handle the data format, but that data was not used
for any other purpose"').
104.
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12, at 37, 40 (describing how
President Bush unilaterally authorized the NSA to collect content of international telephone calls and
emails); PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supranote 1,
at 133-34 (describing how President Bush unilaterally authorized the NSA to conduct surveillance
on telephone and email communications of people inside the United States).
105.
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12, at 8, 37-46 (describing the
bulk telephone metadata collection program, first pursuant to Presidential authorizations, and then
pursuant to orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).
106.
James Glanz et al., Spy Agencies Tap DataStreamingfrom Phone Apps, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

28, 2014, at Al.
107.
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 103, at 12-15 (reporting on the proliferation of
governmental and private industry use of license plate readers to collect and store hundreds of millions of datapoints that include location information about Americans' vehicles); Jessica Renee
Napier,
California
to
Pilot
Electronic
License
Plates,
GOV'T
TECH.,
http://www.govtech.com/transportation/Califomia-to-Pilot-Electronic-License-Plates.html
(Oct. 9,
2013) (describing legislative approval for DMV to implement electronic license plate pilot program).
Nestor Ramos, City Used High-Tech Tracking Software; $650,000 Spent at '13 Hub
108.
Event, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2014, at B1, 13 (internal quotations omitted). The program was a pilot
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relatively innocuous occurrences like unattended packages and illegally
parked vehicles, or engage in facial recognition and track people as they
move through crowds. City officials indicated the pilot project involved
only the former category.1 09
Predictive surveillance promises substantial benefits but poses substantial risks to privacy. The next Part explains why existing surveillance
regulations are not calibrated to regulate predictive surveillance.

III. THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK'S INABILITY TO
REGULATE PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE

A. The Existing Regulatory FrameworkPresumes That Surveillance Begins with Targeting
Existing surveillance laws do not address predictive surveillance.
Like the proverbial generals prepared to fight the last war, the existing
system of surveillance regulation presumes that the government is targeting a specific suspect.
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence begins by
evaluating the target's expectation of privacy. 1 o If the target enjoys no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information at issue, then the
Fourth Amendment does not apply.' This inquiry, of course, requires
that the government select a specific target. Similarly, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a warrant issue only upon probable cause to
believe the target is involved in criminal activity or that the search will
reveal evidence of criminal activity.1 12 Even in the domestic context, the
Fourth Amendment still requires a showing of probable cause, although
that standard may be less restrictive than in the law enforcement context.11 3
Like the constitutional framework, the statutes regulating surveillance also presume that government's first step is to choose a target. For
example, to conduct electronic surveillance under FISA, the government
must show that "the target . .. is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power." 1 4 Although FISA requires a lower showing to obtain business
records, that showing is still target specific. The government must
demonstrate "reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things
sought are relevant to an authorized investigation[,] . . . to obtain foreign

project in which IBM demonstrated surveillance software that the city was considering purchasing.
Id. The city did not disclose the project's existence; the project only came to light when an IBM
employee uploaded data about the project to a public server. Id.

109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979).
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972).
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012).
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intelligence information[,] . . . or to protect against international terrorism."ll

5

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act also requires an assessment of the government's targeting decision. To intercept wire or
electronic communications, law enforcement must show probable cause
to believe that the target has committed or will commit a specified offense.116 To compel an ISP to produce subscriber information, the government must produce "specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information sought . .. are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."'17

This targeting-based approach to surveillance regulation cannot
adapt to a predictive surveillance model in which the first step is to analyze all the data for patterns that could yield individualized suspicion.
The next Part explains why the government should not attempt to fit the
square peg of predictive surveillance into the round hole of targetingbased surveillance regulation.
B. The Perils of ShoehorningPredictiveSurveillance into the Traditional Regulatory Framework
1. The Risk of Rejection Without Regard for the Potential Value of
Predictive Surveillance
There are three reasons why the government should not force predictive surveillance into the traditional regulatory framework. First, a
literal application of targeting-based regulation to predictive surveillance
might result in its summary rejection, regardless of the benefits that predictive surveillance might provide. Imagine, for example, that the NSA's
bulk telephone metadata collection program were designed differently;
that it collected all telephone metadata and then analyzed that data to find
patterns associated with past terrorist activity. If successful, such a program could provide a valuable tool in attempts to thwart future terrorist
attacks. However, a literal application of Section 215 of the Patriot Act
could foreclose such a tool entirely.
Under Section 215,
the government may not obtain business records under FISA without showing "reasonable grounds to believe that the
tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelli-

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2012).
Id. § 2703(d).
USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 50 U.S.C.

§ 1861

(2012).
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gence activities." 1 l9 If the government sought an order for all telephone
metadata records to facilitate predictive surveillance, the court could
reasonably hold that every citizen's records could not possibly be relevant to an authorized investigation. Instead, the court could reason that,
until the government has a specific target in mind, there cannot be any
authorized investigation. Similarly, the court could reason that, if every
record of every telephone call were deemed relevant, then the term relevant would be stretched beyond recognition. And finally, the court could
reason that Congress intended the relevance provision to limit Section 215 orders to instances of particularized suspicion for an ongoing
investigation and did not intend the term to authorize a fishing expedition.120
2. The Risk of Authorizing a Highly Intrusive Surveillance Program Without Adequate Safeguards
On the other hand, if the government successfully shoehorned predictive surveillance into the existing regulatory scheme, it could put privacy at substantial risk. The traditional regulatory scheme lacks the necessary safeguards to guard against the unique risks of predictive surveillance. The Section 215 bulk metadata collection program offers an excellent illustration of how this risk could arise.
For many years, the only court to consider whether Section 215 authorizes bulk collection was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
which upheld bulk collection under Section 215.12 As a result, the NSA
now has a five-year database of American citizens' telephone records.1 22
Yet the available evidence suggests that Congress never intended Section 215 to authorize such vast data collection. Instead, according to Representative James Sensenbrenner, a former Republican House member

119.

Id.

§

1861(b)(2)(A).

These arguments were advanced by the ACLU and by former Representative, and USA
120.
PATRIOT Act drafter, James Sensenbrenner, in ACLU v. Clapper. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law

in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 9-15, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP)); Brief Amicus
Curiae of Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. in Support of Plaintiffs at 4-6, Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724 (No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP)). The court in Clapper, however, rejected these arguments
and held that the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection met the "relevant to an authorized
investigation" standard. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 746-49. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court reached a similar decision. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of

Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *6-7 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29,
2013).
See In re Application of FBI, 2013 WL 5741573, at *9-10. In the wake of the Snowden
121.
disclosures, the Southern District of New York reached the same conclusion as the FISC and held
that the bulk telephone metadata collection met Section 215's "relevant to an authorized investiga-

tion" standard. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 746-49 (dismissing plaintiffs' complaint). The Second
Circuit, however, vacated the District Court's order and held that Section 215 does not authorize
bulk collection of telephone metadata. Clapper, 787 F.3d at 821 (holding that bulk metadata collection program violated Section 215's requirement that the tangible items collected be "relevant" to an
"authorized investigation").
122.
Shane, supranote 43.
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and the drafter of the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress intended to prevent
the government from using Section 215 to engage in bulk collection.1 23
For example, when Congress reauthorized Section 215 in 2006, five
years after its enactment in 2001, Congress limited its scope. 24 In 2001,
Section 215 had only required that the records at issue be "sought for an
[authorized] investigation."' 25 In 2006, Congress attempted to resolve
any uncertainty by amending Section 215 to require that the records be
"relevant to an authorized investigation." 26 In addition, the 2006 revisions added three illustrations of records that are presumptively relevant
to an authorized investigation: records that pertain to
(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the
subject of such authorized investigation; or
(iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a
foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation.127
None of these examples are consistent with the notion that every American's telephone records are "relevant" to an ongoing investigation.
Because Congress did not intend bulk collection under Section 215,
the law lacks the institutional safeguards necessary to protect such a sensitive dataset. First, given the unprecedented scope of the telephone records database, the executive branch should not be in charge of developing its own minimization procedures. Yet under Section 215, with regard
to any nonpublic information obtained about a U.S. person, the Attorney
General is responsible for drafting the minimization procedures that will,
presumably, prevent abuse and misuse by the executive.128 And nothing
prevents the Attorney General from scaling back the minimization procedures over time. Section 215 required that the Attorney General promulgate a general set of minimization procedures by 2006 but did not prevent the Attorney General from modifying those procedures from time to
-129

time.

Second, there is no meaningful review of the Attorney General's
minimization procedures. The only entity in a position to examine the
123.

Brief Amicus Curiae of Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., supranote 120, at 2-4.

124.
Compare USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-177, § 106, 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)), with
H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt. 1, at 61 (2001).
H.R. REP. No. 107-236, at 9. Representative Sensenbrenner stated in a committee report
125.
that this meant the records had to be "relevant" to an ongoing foreign intelligence investigation. Id.
at 61.
126.
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Section 215 requires the Attorney General to adopt procedures that "minimize the reten128.
tion, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting
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129. See id. § 1861(g)(1).
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minimization procedures is the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. However, the FISC's assessment of the minimization procedures
is merely pro forma. Section 215 does not require the FISC to review the
substance of those minimization procedures.1 30 Instead, before issuing a
Section 215 order, the FISC need only ensure that the FBI's application
"enumerat[es]" the relevant minimization procedures.13 1 The only FISC
opinion that has suggested that the FISC can review the minimization
procedures for statutory compliance was Judge Eagan's decision, prepared and released publicly in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations.132 In a pre-Snowden opinion, the FISC merely noted that the minimization procedures existed and were similar to procedures authorized
in earlier Section 215 orders.1 33 And in the earliest publicly disclosed
Section 215 order, the FISC did not evaluate the minimization procedures at all; it simply noted their existence.1 34
Third, Section 215 immunizes bulk collection from meaningful review because the only entities that can challenge the bulk collection are
the parties receiving the collection orders: the telecommunications companies. 135 The hundreds of millions of Americans whose records are collected and potentially queried cannot dispute the collection order under
the statute.136 To date, no telecommunications company has challenged a
Section 215 order.1 37 Nor are such challenges in the telecommunications
companies' best interest, given that they compete for substantial government contracts.1 38 And even if a telecommunications company chal130.

See id.

§ 1861(b)(2)(B),

(c)(1).

131.
Id. In the unlikely event of an appeal from a Section 215 production order, even the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review would merely assess whether the order met the
requirements of Section 215, rather than assessing whether the minimization requirements satisfied

the statutory mandate. Id. § 1861 (f)(2)(B).
132.
In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (stating that FISA
court "may not authorize the production [under Section 215] if the minimization procedures are
insufficient").

133. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 09-13, 2009 WL 9150914, at *1 (FISA Ct. Sept. 3, 2009) (noting that the govemnment's application enumerated the minimization procedures, and the procedures were "similar to
the minimization procedures approved and adopted as binding" in an earlier Section 215 authorization).

134. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 WL 7137486, at *2 (FISA Ct. Aug. 18, 2006) (ordering that use of
the bulk telephone metadata "shall occur solely according to the procedures described in the application").

135.
136.

50 U.S.C. § 1861(f).
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[S]ection 215 does not

provide for any person other than a recipient of an order to challenge the orders' legality or otherwise participate in the process.").

137. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *5 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
138.
Telecommunications companies certainly have cause for concern. When
cations refused the Bush Administration's request to voluntarily participate in a
phone surveillance program in early 2001, the government reportedly cancelled
contract in retaliation. Ellen Nakashima & Dan Eggen, Former CEO Says U.S.
Firm, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2007, at AOl.
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lenged a collection order, that challenge would be conducted secretly,
under seal.1 39 Even the existence of the collection order is secret; recipients of collection orders are prohibited from disclosing that they have
40
received an order.1

Fourth, Section 215 did not require sufficient disclosure to Congress
to facilitate meaningful congressional oversight. Section 215 merely requires annual reporting to the House and Senate Select Committees on
Intelligence and the Senate Judiciary Committee of (1) the number of
production orders requested, (2) the number of production orders granted, modified, or denied, and (3) the number of production orders granted,
modified, or denied, that related to library records, firearms sales, tax
returns, educational records, and medical records containing personally
identifying information.141 Section 215 also requires annual reports to
Congress as a whole of the total number of production orders requested,
granted, modified, and denied. 142 But neither of these reports requires
disclosure of the massive volume of information to be collected. Just a
few production requests could yield phone records concerning hundreds
of millions of Americans.
Representative Sensenbrenner's Amicus Brief in ACLU v. Clapperl43 explained why these minimal reporting obligations failed to apprise Congress of the scope of the bulk collection program under Section 215. Throughout the entire program, the only report that even hinted
at the massive nature of the program was a five-page report made available to members of Congress to read in a secure location in 2009 and
2011.'" That report was merely a summary and did not disclose any of
the FISC orders.1 45 "Moreover, the report was not made available to
House Members in 201 1.",146 The one sentence hinting at the scope of
collection read as follows: "The orders generally require production of
the business records (as described above) relating to substantially all of
the telephone calls handled by the companies, including both calls made
between the United States and a foreign country and calls made entirely
within the United States." 47

139.

50 U.S.C.

§ 1861(f)(5).

140.
Id. § 1861(d). The only exceptions to this gag order are for disclosures necessary to comply with the order, disclosures to an attorney to obtain legal advice concerning the order, and disclosures specifically permitted by the FBI. Id.

141.
142.
143.

Id. § 1862(b).
Id § 1862(c).
959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

144.
Brief Amicus Curiae of Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. in Support of Plaintiffs,
supra note 120, at 9.

145.
146.

Id.
Id

147.

Id. at 9 n.3 (quoting the defendant's motion to dismiss) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In sum, by forcing a mass-collection program into the traditional
model of surveillance regulation, the executive branch left the people
inadequately protected.
3. The Risk of Authorizing a Highly Intrusive Surveillance Scheme
with No Political Mandate
A third reason not to shoehorn predictive surveillance techniques into existing legislative schemes is the absence of political support. Again,
the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection helps illustrate this
risk. Snowden's revelation of the Section 215 program generated substantial public outcry.148 That outcry stemmed partly from the secret nature of the Section 215 program and the other programs that Snowden
disclosed.
This Article does not advocate that Congress enact the regulatory
scheme described below. Instead, the Article explores whether such a
scheme could be constitutional and how such a scheme should be constructed. But part of the value of enacting legislation targeted at this new
form of surveillance would flow from the public debate that would take
place. Congress would ensure that the public had the opportunity to voice
its approval, or disapproval, in light of the proposed security benefits.
Today, in the wake of the surprising Snowden disclosures, public support
for authorizing predictive surveillance programs seems highly unlikely.
But developments in both technology and security may change public
perception over time.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE IN
ANTITERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS

A new regulatory framework is necessary to accommodate the
unique needs and risks associated with predictive surveillance. This
framework should recognize that there are multiple stages to Big Data
analysis. A framework to regulate predictive surveillance must recognize
the analytical distinctions between collecting the data, building a predictive model, and using that model to target an investigation. At the same
time, the framework must also recognize and guard against the very real
risks posed by predictive surveillance.

148.
See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, OBAMA'S NSA SPEECH HAS LITTLE IMPACT ON
SKEPTICAL PUBLIC 1 (2014), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/1-20-

14%20NSA%2ORelease.pdf (reporting Pew Research Center/USA Today poll finding that 53% of
Americans oppose the NSA's bulk telephone and Internet metadata collection programs, while only
40% support them); Adam Gabbatt, ProtestorsRally for 'The Day We Fight Back' Against Mass

Surveillance,

THE

GUARDIAN

(Feb.

11,

2014

1:12

PM),

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/ll/day-fight-back-protest-nsa-mass-surveillance
(discussing international protest of mass surveillance programs that involved tens of thousands of calls
and emails to Congress, physical protests planned in fifteen countries, and participation by leading
technology companies such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft).
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A. Deciding Whether the InitialData Collection Constitutes a Fourth
Amendment Search
1. Data Collected from Third Parties
The NSA could use predictive analytics on data that the government
collects from third parties or on data that the government collects on its
own. 149 For data collected from third parties, the Fourth Amendment may
not apply at all. Currently, under the third-party doctrine, one cannot
expect privacy in information shared with third parties, "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed."', 5 0 For example, in Smith v. Maryland,'5 ' police suspected
Smith of robbery and of placing obscene and harassing phone calls to the
robbery victim. 152 The police asked the telephone company to install a
pen register'5 at the company's central offices to record the numbers
dialed from the phone in Smith's home.1 54 The pen register revealed a
call to the victim's home, and police subsequently obtained a warrant to
search Smith's home.15 5 At trial, Smith moved to suppress all evidence
obtained and derived from the pen register.' 56 The trial court denied the
motion and convicted Smith after a bench trial.15 7
The Supreme Court held that Smith had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the numbers that he dialed.'58 The Court reasoned that "[a]ll
telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the
telephone company" when they make a call and that the phone company
59
records the numbers dialed and uses them for a variety of reasons.
Smith, therefore, "assumed the risk" that the telephone company would
60
reveal to the police the numbers that he dialed.1
Several courts have considered whether the third-party doctrine applies to the NSA's bulk collection of telephone metadata from the tele-

149.
150.
745, 752
373 U.S.
151.
152.

See supra Part II.B.3.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S.
(1971); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States,
427, 438 (1963)).
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 737.

Id. at 735. The Court noted that "[a] pen register is a mechanical device that records the
153.
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the
telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls

are actually completed." Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161
n. 1(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
ring)).
159.
160.

Id. at 737.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737-38.
Id. at 743 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurId. at 742.
Id. at 745.
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communications companies. In Klayman v. Obama, Judge Leon held
that the third-party doctrine did not apply and that the plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment claim was likely to succeed on the merits. 16 2 Judge Leon
distinguished Smith v. Maryland because circumstances had changed
since 1979.163 Judge Leon reasoned that "the evolutions in the Government's surveillance capabilities, citizens' phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA and telecom companies" justified distinguishing
Smith.1 6
Judge Leon relied in part on the massive aggregation of data that the
bulk collection program involved.16 5 He drew a parallel to United States
v. Jones,166 where five Justices emphasized the significance of aggregating GPS data about a target.167 Prior to Jones, the Court had held in United States v. Knotts'68 that tracking the defendant's car on a public highway did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no expectation of privacy in one's travels on public roads. 169 In Jones, however,
the Court reached the opposite result. 170 Five Justices reasoned that law
enforcement conducted a Fourth Amendment search by using a GPS
tracking device to track the defendant's vehicle twenty-four hours a day
for a month. 171 These five Justices relied on the aggregation of data over
a month to find that the tracking violated a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 172
Judge Leon applied the same aggregation idea to distinguish Klayman from Smith v. Maryland. The pen register in Smith only tracked a
single defendant's telephone metadata for a day. 173 But the Section 215
bulk collection program built a comprehensive, five-year record of
Americans' phone calls. 174 For Judge Leon, this was a difference not
merely in degree, but in kind. 175

161.

957 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2013), vacated on other grounds, 800 F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (reversing preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate likelihood of
success on standing issue).

162. Id. at 37, 41.
163. Id. at 31-37.
164. Id. at 31.
165. Id. at 32.
166.
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
167. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Kagan, JJ.)).
168. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
169. Id. at 281.
170. See 132 S. Ct. at 954-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 954-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 958, 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
172.
Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that people do not "reasonably expect that
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on"); id at 964
(Alito, J., concurring) (stating that society does not expect law enforcement to "secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a very long period").

173.
174.
175.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
Id. at 32-37.
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On the other hand, the Southern District of New York and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court have held that the third-party doctrine shields the bulk metadata collection program from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.1 7 6 In ACLU v. Clapper, Judge Pauley of the Southern District of New York held that the bulk metadata collection program was
analogous to the pen register upheld in Smith v. Maryland, which applied
the third-party doctrine to telephone numbers that the defendant dialed. 77
Judge Pauley rejected the idea that building a massive database of every
American's telephone records for the past five years changed the analysis: "The collection of breathtaking amounts of information unprotected
by the Fourth Amendment does not transform that sweep into a Fourth
Amendment search." 78 Judge Pauley also rejected the ACLU's argument
that the database gave the government a "rich mosaic" of each person's
life.1 79 Judge Pauley reasoned that merely collecting the numbers did not
paint that mosaic because the government cannot query the database
without tying that query to an approved target. so Moreover, the results of
the query simply tell the government who has had telephone calls with
the target-but not who uses those telephone numbers.' 8 ' The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court engaged in a very similar analysis of the
issue when it approved a production order under the Section 215 bulk
telephone metadata collection program.1 82
This Article proposes that the third-party doctrine should not apply
to the type of mass collection necessary for predictive analytics. As I
have argued elsewhere, the third-party doctrine is flawed because it represents an "all or nothing" approach to privacy that ignores reality in
several significant ways.183 First, the third-party doctrine fails to distinguish third parties as ends from third parties as means.1 84 In the case that
176.
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 785 F.3d 787
(2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Section 215 did not authorize bulk collection); In re Application of the
FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013
WL 5741573, at *2-3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749-50, 752.
177.
178.
Id. at 752. This sentiment, however, ignores the approach of five Justices in United States
v. Jones. For those Justices, short-term tracking of one's public movements did not trigger the Fourth
Amendment, but long-term tracking of those same movements did. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957-58, 964
(Alito, J., concurring joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id at 954-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Alito that long-term GPS tracking violates the Fourth Amendment's
reasonable expectation of privacy).

179.
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 750-53.
180.
Id. at 750-52.
181.
Id. at 751.
182.
See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2-3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). The circuit
courts may never reach the Fourth Amendment issue because Section 215 sunset on June 1, 2015,
and was replaced by the USA FREEDOM Act, which prohibits bulk collection and takes effect on

November 28, 2015. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268; In re Application ofthe FBI, Bankr. No. 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562, at *4-5 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015).
183.

Spencer, supra note 102, at 401.

184.

Id. at 401-02.
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first gave rise to the third-party doctrine, United States v. Miller,1 the
Court relied on its earlier "misplaced trust" cases.186 Under those cases,
the Court warned that people who share information with acquaintances
take risk that those acquaintances may abuse their trust and tell others,
including the police.' 87 But by extending that logic to the telephone numbers dialed in Smith v. Maryland,8 8 the Court ignored the difference between ends and means. In the misplaced trust cases, the communication
to an untrustworthy acquaintance is both end and means. But the telephone company's record of the numbers that I dialed are merely the
means to a different end-the communication with an acquaintance.189
Second, the third-party doctrine ignores what I have called the "anti-aggregation norm."1 90 This visceral, societal fear of pervasive surveillance is a common theme in both literature and legal commentary.1 91 And
it figured prominently in the concurring opinions that rejected long-term,
warrantless GPS tracking in United States v. Jones. Justice Alito reasoned that people simply do not expect that the government can "secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a
very long period." 92 And Justice Sotomayor reasoned that people should
not have to "expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on." 9 3
The anti-aggregation norm also lies at the heart of Riley v. California, 194 where the Court rejected law enforcement's attempt to subject cell
phone data to the search incident to arrest doctrine.1 95 Under that doctrine, when law enforcement officers arrest a suspect, they may search
personal property on the arrestee's person or within his immediate control without a warrant.196 This exception to the probable cause requirement exists for two reasons: (1) to protect the arresting officers from
185.
186.
v. United
187.
188.
189.

425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at 443-44 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)).
White, 401 U.S. at 751-52; Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-46 (1979).
See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 861-63 (Mass. 2014) (refusing to apply

the third-party doctrine to cell site location information because individuals do not intend to voluntarily transmit their location to the cell service provider when making a call and location information
bears no relation to the communicative purpose of the call).
190.
Spencer, supra note 102, at 402-03 (discussing privacy themes in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Fourand Franz Kafka's The Trial).

191.
192.

Id.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).

Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); accordAugustine, 4 N.E.3d at 862-63 (declining to
193.
apply the third-party doctrine to cell site location data obtained from a cell phone provider and
reasoning that "even CSLI limited to the cell site locations of telephone calls made and received may
yield a treasure trove of very detailed and extensive information about the individual's 'comings and
goings' in both public and private places").

194.
195.
196.

134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
Id. at 2485.
Id. at 2482-84.
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harm, and (2) to prevent the destruction of evidence.' 97 The Court distinguished cell phones for several reasons. First, the Court reasoned that
searching a cell phone would not serve the doctrine's purposes, because a
cell phone neither threatens officer safety nor triggers a need to preserve
evidence.' 9 8 Second, the Court reasoned that the vast aggregation of data
found within a cell phone rendered a cell phone search far more intrusive
than a physical search of objects on one's person.' 99 As the Court explained:
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only
contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in
the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never
200
found in a home in any form-unless the phone is.
Finally, the third-party doctrine rests on a flawed assumption that
the third-party disclosure constitutes consent for further use of the information disclosed.20' In United States v. Miller, the Court relied on the
notion that bank and telephone customers voluntarily assume the risk that
third parties will disclose their information. 202 If this reasoning ever justified an all-encompassing third-party doctrine, it does not hold true today.
First, consumers do not have a meaningful choice about whether to use
services that involve exchanging data with third parties.

203

And second,

even if consumers had a choice, they would lack the information needed
204
to exercise that choice.
Given the risks posed by mass-surveillance programs, Judge Leon's
approach would offer much-needed privacy protection. As described
below, if predictive surveillance programs are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, they would likely survive if used for antiterrorism purpos205
es, but not if used for ordinary law enforcement purposes.
2. Data Collected in Public Spaces
For information that the government collects on its own, such as
video of license plates or people's faces in public spaces, there is no
third-party doctrine issue. Instead, the initial question would be whether
people enjoy any reasonable expectation of privacy in information exposed to the public. On this issue, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Jones would again be instructive.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id
Id
Id.

at 2483-84.
at 2485-87.
at 2488-91.
at 2491.

201.

Spencer, supra note 98, at 404-05.

202.

425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).

203.

Spencer, supra note 98, at 404-05.

204.
205.

Id at 405-06.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
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Proponents of predictive surveillance could rely on the proposition,
tracing back to Katz v. United States,206 that people enjoy no expectation
of privacy in information that they knowingly expose to public view.207
Based on Katz and subsequent cases, these proponents could argue that
one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's license plate or
face, at least when exposed to public view. Opponents of predictive surveillance, however, could emphasize the massive aggregation of data that
such programs require. In United States v. Jones, the thirty-day aggregation of location data about a single individual was enough to overcome
the general rule that one lacks an expectation of privacy in public spaces.208 But the aggregation in Jones would pale in comparison to the massive aggregation necessary for predictive surveillance. For example, the
Section 215 program collected and stored five years of metadata on
American telephone users' calls.209 Similarly, a national network of automatic license plate readers could create a catalog of where every car in
the country traveled for as long as the program operated.210 Gathering
these searchable dossiers of location data on all drivers would likely be
enough to trigger a Fourth Amendment search.
As discussed in the next section, finding that the initial data collection constitutes a Fourth Amendment search does not end the inquiry.
The court must next determine whether the collection of such information in an antiterrorism investigation is a reasonable search under the
circumstances.
B. Applying the FourthAmendment's ReasonablenessRequirement in
AntiterrorismInvestigations
1. The Keith Case and Domestic Security Investigations
In the law enforcement context, reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment generally requires that officers obtain a warrant supported
by probable cause that the search will reveal evidence of a particular
crime. 211 In the context of domestic security and foreign intelligence investigations, however, the reasonableness requirement is more nuanced.
The Supreme Court discussed how the Fourth Amendment applies
beyond ordinary law enforcement investigations in United States v. United States District Court (the Keith case).2 12 The government investigated
the defendant, Plamondon, in connection with the bombing of a CIA
206.
207.
208.
ring).

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351.
132 S. Ct. 945, 955-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concur-

209.
Shane, supra note 43.
210.
For a discussion of widespread uses of automatic license plate readers, see generally AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 103, at 7-15.

211.
212.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-15 (1984).
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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213

office in Michigan.
During the investigation, the government engaged
in warrantless wiretapping of Plamondon's phone. 214 Rather than obtain
court approval, "the Attorney General approved the wiretaps 'to gather
intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from
attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing
structure of the Government."'215
On the facts before it, the Court held that the government should
have obtained prior judicial approval for the wiretaps, although the Court
did not specify exactly what form that prior approval had to take.2 16 More
broadly, the Court recognized that domestic security investigations involve different interests than law enforcement investigations. 217 In domestic security investigations, targets may be more difficult to identify,
investigations may be less precise, and the emphasis is often on prevent218
ing harmful acts or preparing for a future crisis.
In light of those differences, the Court reasoned, the Fourth
Amendment may apply more flexibly in domestic security investigations
than in law enforcement investigations. 2 19 The procedures must be "reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens." 220 The "application and affidavit showing probable cause need not follow the exact
requirements of [the Wiretap Act] but should allege other circumstances
,,221
Ultimately, the Court
more appropriate to domestic security cases.
held that the type of domestic surveillance at issue-wiretaps-required
prior judicial approval "in accordance with such reasonable standards as
the Congress may prescribe."222
Although the Court expressed no opinion on "the scope of the President's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country,"223 lower courts have recognized a
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.224 However,
mass-collection programs would largely involve data about ordinary
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 299.
Id. at 300-01.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 323-24.
Id. at 322.

218.

Id.

219.

Id. at 322-23.

220.
221.
222.

Id
Id. at 323.
Id. at 323-24.

223.

Id. at 308.

224.

See, e.g., In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelli-

gence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) ("Applying principles derived
from the special needs cases, we conclude that this type of foreign intelligence surveillance possesses characteristics that qualify it for such an exception."); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629

F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign
intelligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would, following Keith, 'unduly frustrate' the President in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities.").
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Americans in the United States, rather than individuals overseas or
agents of foreign powers. For example, as the FISC itself has observed,
under the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata program, "the vast majority of the call-detail records provided are expected to concern communications that are (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly
within the United States, including local telephone calls." 225 For that reason, predictive surveillance programs cannot credibly fall within the foreign intelligence exception.
No court to date has applied the Keith domestic security approach to
bulk data collection, as opposed to targeted surveillance. Although the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court repeatedly issued Section 215
orders, it appears that the FISC simply relied on the argument that the
third-party doctrine removed the metadata from the Fourth Amendment
entirely. For example, Judge Eagan's opinion in the wake of the Snowden disclosure considered only third-party doctrine and held that the collection did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.226 Similarly, although both Judge Leon and Judge Pauley assessed the constitutionality
of the bulk telephone metadata program, neither of them considered the
22
Keith case's Fourth Amendment framework.227 Judge Pauley did not
reach the question of how to apply the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement because he held that the metadata were subject to the thirdparty doctrine. 22 8 And after Judge Leon distinguished Smith v. Maryland
and rejected the third-party doctrine as inapplicable to bulk telephone
metadata collection, he did not consider how the Keith case framework
might apply. 229 Instead, Judge Leon relied on cases holding that warrantless searches could be authorized in cases of special needs beyond ordi230
Here, although Judge Leon recognized antiternary law enforcement.
rorist investigations as a special need, he reasoned that there was no need
to collect the metadata in bulk.231 It could achieve the same results by
seeking targeted orders from each of the telecommunications provid232
ers.
2. Suspicionless Searches and Special Needs Cases
Given the dearth of authority, a court reviewing a predictive surveillance program would have to consider how the Court has treated other
225. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 WL 7137486, at *1 n.I (FISA Ct. Aug. 18, 2006).
226. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2-3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
227. See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 785 F.3d
787 (2d Cir. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-42 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d
599 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749-52.
228.
229. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 30-42.
230. Id. at 38-39.
231. Id. at 39-41.
232. Id. at 40-41.
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suspicionless surveillance practices. Ordinarily, a search is unreasonable
without particularized suspicion.233 The Court, however, has recognized
that "special needs" beyond ordinary law enforcement can justify exceptions to the particularized suspicion requirement.234 The Court's suspicionless checkpoint cases offer a useful analogy to predictive surveillance.235
Although the Court rejected suspicionless checkpoints for ordinary
law enforcement purposes,236 the Court approved checkpoints that served
special government interests such as border enforcement and deterring
238
the
drunk driving.2 37 For example, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
checkchallenges
to
immigration
Court considered Fourth Amendment
points on highways less than 100 miles from the Mexican border.239 To
determine whether reasonable suspicion was required before conducting
such a routine checkpoint stop, the Court balanced the interests at
stake.240
The Court recognized the significant governmental interest in policing the nation's borders against illegal immigration and drug trafficking.241 The Court also noted that it was impractical to require reasonable
suspicion for stops on major routes because the speed and volume of
traffic rendered it impractical to give cars particularized study to discern
233.

See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).

234.
For example, the Court's drug testing cases involve suspicionless searches based on
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." E.g., Vemonia School Dist. 47J v.

Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (upholding random drug testing of student-athletes); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 665-66 (1989) (upholding drug tests for United States Customs Service employees seeking
transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989) (upholding drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in train accidents or found
to be in violation of particular safety regulations). Administrative searches are another area where
suspicionless searches are permitted, provided that those searches are appropriately limited. See, e.g.,
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-05 (1987) (upholding warrantless administrative inspection
of premises of "closely regulated" business); Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534-39
(1967) (upholding administrative inspection to ensure compliance with city housing code). Neither
drug testing nor administrative searches offer a meaningful analogy to pervasive data collection
because they are targeted at a very limited segment of the population.

235.

See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745-46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (analo-

gizing to Supreme Court's checkpoint cases to find that USA PATRIOT Act's "significant purpose"
amendment to FISA did not violate Fourth Amendment).

236.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-42 (2000).

237.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-65 (1976) (relying on state's interest
in deterring illegal immigration and cross-border drug trafficking to affirm suspicionless highway

checkpoints); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 455 (1990) (relying on state's
significant interest in deterring drunk driving to affirm brief, suspicionless stops at highway sobriety
checkpoints so that police could detect signs of intoxication and remove impaired drivers from the

road); cf Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979) (suggesting in dicta that a generally
applicable roadblock at which police could check all motorists' license and registration would be
supported by a legitimate interest in roadway safety, rather than a general interest in law enforcement).

238.
239.
240.
241.

428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Id. at 545.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 556-57.
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whether they were transporting illegal aliens or drugs.242 Thus, a requirement of reasonable suspicion would frustrate the government's interest.2 43

In contrast, the Court found that the checkpoint stops effected a
"quite limited" intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests because the
stops required only a response to a brief question or two and production
244
There was
of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States.
no search of the vehicle's interior beyond what could be seen in plain
view.245 The Court distinguished roving-patrol stops as more intrusive
because roving-patrol stops often took place at night on secluded roads
and had the potential to frighten motorists.246 In addition, routine checkpoint stops were less disruptive to traffic than roving-patrol stops because checkpoint locations are known to motorists and checkpoints involve less discretionary enforcement activity and less potential for abusive or harassing stops.247

Collecting bulk data for predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investigations presents several parallels to the checkpoint searches in Martinez-Fuerte. First, the government interest in disrupting terrorist attacks
is more compelling than its interest in deterring illegal immigration and
drug trafficking. And requiring particularized suspicion before collecting
bulk data would make predictive surveillance not merely impracticable,
as was the case in Martinez-Fuerte, but impossible because predictive
surveillance requires collecting all of the data first.
In addition, as long as the program contains the stringent safeguards
described below, 24 8 the government could characterize the interference
with Fourth Amendment interests as relatively minimal. Although the
predictive analytics will search for patterns in all of the metadata, the
only individuals whose data would ultimately be investigated would be
those who match a pattern that correlates with past terrorist activity. In
this regard, the initial data collection may be less intrusive on Fourth
Amendment interests than the routine checkpoint stops in MartinezFuerte, where motorists faced suspicionless detention and questioning.2 49
If, however, the program lacked adequate safeguards, there would
be a real risk that it could be used not merely for antiterrorism purposes,
but for general law enforcement purposes. Such an expansion would
distinguish the predictive surveillance program from the suspicionless
checkpoints that the Court has approved in the past. Accordingly, predic242.
243.

Id.
Id. at 557.

244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 559.

248.

See infra Part V.

249.

428 U.S. at 561-63.
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tive surveillance must be supported by a strict regulatory system, which
is proposed in the next Part.
V. A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE
IN ANTITERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS
The surveillance scandals of 2013 read like a laundry list of the
public's fears about surveillance: secret surveillance programs, government employees abusing their access for personal reasons, and massive
250
Surveillance harms have been catalogued in
breaches of security.
many different ways, but they fall into two distinct categories. "Data
harms" flow from the data themselves, through such mechanisms as unwanted secondary uses, internal abuses, and security breaches.25 1 In contrast, "chilling effects" flow from the mere act of surveillance itself.252 If
the government were to pursue predictive surveillance programs aimed at
deterring terrorism, it would have to create a new regulatory scheme that
accounts for not only the general risks of government surveillance, but
also the unique risks posed by predictive surveillance and the massive
databases that it requires.
A. Regulating Bulk Data Collection and the Use ofPredictive Analytics
As discussed above, the traditional surveillance model requires particularized suspicion about the target before a neutral magistrate can issue a warrant. Such particularized suspicion is impossible in the case of
predictive surveillance since the analytical techniques require collecting
data about everyone, most of whom will have no connection to the terrorist activity at issue.
Nevertheless, in light of the massive databases required for predictive surveillance, prior judicial approval must be required. That judicial
approval cannot be premised on probable cause that the collection will
reveal evidence of a crime 253 or that the target is an agent of a foreign

250.
See generally Siobhan Gorman, NSA Officers Spy on Love Interests, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
23, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/23/nsa-officers-sometimes-spy-on-loveinterests/; Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance
Revelations,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
11,
2013,
9:00
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance;
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phonerecords-verizon-court-order.
251.
See, e.g., Justin Brookman & G.S. Hans, Why Collection Matters: Surveillance as a De
Facto Privacy Harm, in BIG DATA & PRIVACY: MAKING ENDS MEET II, 11-12 (Future of Privacy
Forum & Stanford Law School Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y eds., 2013), available at
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/Big-Data-and-Privacy-Paper-Collection.pdf;
Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843,
878-90 (2002) (discussing how secondary uses and inadequate security threaten to erode privacy).
252. See, e.g., Brookman & Hans, supra note 251, at 12-13.
253. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion) (describing probable
cause standard).
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power. 25 4 Instead, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should not
authorize bulk collection without (1) specific enumeration of the prior
terrorist activities that will be used to find patterns in the data, and (2)
expert testimony establishing a statically valid methodology to search for
those patterns. In addition, the FISC order should prohibit the government from conducting any analysis beyond what the FISC explicitly approved and should prohibit the government from attempting the approved analysis more than once without FISC approval.
To establish a statistically valid methodology, the government
should be held to the Daubert2 55 standard governing the admissibility of
scientific evidence. That is, the government must persuade the FISC that
the proposed methodology is scientifically valid and can properly be
applied to the data to be collected. To assess scientific validity, the FISC
would consider (1) whether the technique can be tested; (2) whether the
technique has been subjected to peer review and testing; (3) the technique's known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (5) whether the
technique has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community.2 56 These procedures should be conducted under seal to
the extent necessary to avoid disclosure of information that could harm
efforts at predictive or traditional surveillance of terrorist activity.
Given the successes of predictive analytics in a variety of condemonstrating a scientifically valid methodology should not
texts,
prove onerous.2 58 The purpose of this initial requirement is to prevent the
government from engaging in a fishing expedition.
257

B. Regulating Subsequent Targeting Based on the Results ofPredictive
Analytics
Once the government has executed its court-approved analysis, it
must report its findings to the FISC-regardless of whether or not the
searches revealed any significant patterns. This follow-up reporting will
ensure that the FISC remains informed as to what techniques do and do
not yield significant results.
If the technique revealed patterns associated with past terrorist activity, the government could rely on those patterns to seek an order from
the FISC to conduct targeted surveillance on individuals whose metadata
match those patterns. As in the pre-collection phase, the government
would have to present the FISC with scientifically valid evidence that the
patterns were statistically significant.
254.
255.

50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993).

256.

See id.

257.

See supra Part II.B.1-3.

258.

SIEGEL, supra note 18, at 4-9 (discussing widespread use of predictive analytics).
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This two-stage approach has some basis in recent NSA history. In
the 1990s, NSA analyst William Binney and his team developed ThinThread, a program that would intercept global phone and Internet data
and analyze it for patterns to help identify terrorists. 259 Although the system focused on international communications, it inevitably captured domestic communications as well.260 To protect Americans' privacy, ThinThread encrypted the data before conducting pattern analysis.26 1 Once the
system found a strong enough pattern, agents could seek a warrant to
262
Binney, however, was unable to persuade
decrypt the relevant data.
top NSA officials to deploy the program.26 3 In 2000, the NSA rejected
the system because of constitutional concerns raised by collecting domestic communications, regardless of the encryption.264
Conducting a search based on a statistically significant pattern is
somewhat analogous to relying on profiles to conduct airline passenger
screening. In United States v. Sokolow, 265 the Court held that DEA
agents' use of DEA profiles as part of the basis to stop a suspected drug
courier did not render a Terry stop inappropriate.266 This Article's proposed regulatory framework includes more constitutional safeguards than
were imposed on the officer in Sokolow. Because the agents could make
an on-the-spot decision, there was the risk that they might take into ac267
count inappropriate characteristics such as race.
But this proposed predictive surveillance framework would involve no such risk since the
FISC would oversee the decision to target an individual based on the
predictive model. In addition, this proposed predictive surveillance
framework would involve judicial oversight of the process used to generate the predictive model. In contrast, there appeared to be no prior judi-

259.
JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN
A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 34 (2014); Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas
Drake an Enemy of the State?, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, at 46.
260.
Mayer, supra note 259, at 46.

261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Id.

264.
Id. This objection seems ironic in light of the NSA's post-9/11 I role in warrantless wiretapping. Id. Instead of the relatively nimble ThinThread, the NSA implemented a privately built
system called Trailblazer that would have analyzed the NSA's massive data stores without using
encryption. Id.; ANGWIN, supra note 259, at 34. The NSA eventually abandoned Trailblazer after
"massive cost overruns and technical failures." Id.

265.

490 U.S. 1 (1989).

Id. at 10-11. In Terry v. Ohio, the Court held that the police may conduct brief investiga266.
tive stops based on reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be

afoot." 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
Cf Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that requiring reasonable
267.
suspicion protects innocents from "'overbearing or harassing' police conduct carried out solely on
the basis of imprecise stereotypes of what criminals look like, or on the basis of irrelevant personal
characteristics such as race" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 & n.1 1)).
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cial approval of the drug courier profiles in Sokolow, which the DEA
268
developed on its own.
C. ProhibitingAll Secondary Uses of the Comprehensive Database
One of Big Data's primary benefits is that existing data can often be
used to solve new problems. 2 69 That benefit, however, can also be a curse
because data holders face constant temptation to use their data for as
many purposes as possible. In one recent example, Ohio residents were
surprised to learn in 2013 that over 26,000 state and federal government
employees had been authorized to run facial recognition searches in the
photos in Ohio's drivers license registry. 270 Authorized users included
employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, Pennsylvania State Police, and several Kentucky police departments. 271 Roughly 1,000 users were outside the state of Ohio. There were
even authorized users in the Department of Defense, the State Depart272
Most of the authorized users
ment, and the Department of Education.
were employees of Ohio police departments and courts. 2 73 Ohio's Attorney General implemented the facial recognition program with no authorizing legislation, no public warning or input, and no prior review of security protocols.2 74
Given the sensitive nature of a single database containing all citizens' phone metadata or location information, any predictive surveillance regulation must prohibit all secondary uses of the underlying database. Otherwise, the public's fear could render a predictive surveillance
program politically infeasible.275 The government would not be permitted
to use the database for any purpose other than to build the predictive
model. This prohibition would hold the government to its representation
that the predictive surveillance program was necessary to prevent terrorism, rather than for general law enforcement purposes. Only the information gathered after the court-approved targeting phase could be used
in any subsequent investigation or prosecution.
See id. at 10 & n.6 (noting that "the DEA has trained narcotics officers to identify drug
268.
smugglers on the basis of the sort of circumstantial evidence at issue here").
269.
See Spencer, supra note 251, at 880-85 (discussing how data collected for one use are
inevitably put to secondary uses).
270.
Chrissie Thompson & Jessie Balmert, Face-Check Access Goes Beyond Ohio,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 25, 2013, at A8.

271.
272.
273.
274.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id

275.
See, e.g., Gabbatt, supra note 148 (discussing international protest of mass surveillance
programs that involved tens of thousands of calls and emails to Congress, physical protests planned
in fifteen countries, and participation by leading technology companies such as Google, Facebook,
and Microsoft); Susan Page, Poll: Most Americans Now Oppose the NSA Program, USA TODAY
(Jan. 20, 2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/20/poll-nsasurveillance/4638551/ (citing USA Today/Pew Research Center poll finding that 53% of Americans
oppose the NSA's bulk telephone and Internet metadata collection programs, while only 40% support them).
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D. Limiting the Time Period That the Data Can Cover
The greater the period of time that the data represent, the greater the
risk of abuse or misuse.276 For example, a database of cell phone records
covering thirty days may pose far less temptation for abuse than the same
database covering a five-year period. This is because the five-year database can paint a far more detailed picture of its subjects. Yet there is a
tension at play because predictive analytics will usually yield better results from data covering a longer time period. And the necessary retention period will likely vary depending on the specific issues being analyzed. Accordingly, legislating a fixed retention period would likely be
unsound policy. Instead, the new regulatory scheme should require the
judge issuing the order to specify the time period that the data may cover,
based on the time period supported in the government's initial Daubert
*277
showing.
E. Security Against Internal Misuse and Abuse
Any collection of data is suspect to internal abuse. 278 This is not a
new problem. Historians have chronicled how powerful government actors have abused their access to information. 279 J. Edgar Hoover used
government data to intimidate and blackmail from the 1920s through the
early 1970s.280 The Kennedy Administration authorized the House
Committee on Un-American Activities to request individuals' tax retums.281 A military intelligence project in the early 1970s compiled dossiers on thousands of U.S. citizens opposed to the Vietnam War.2 82 And
President Nixon habitually abused government resources for personal
political gain.283
Government databases are vulnerable to abuse by relatively lowlevel employees. Such low-level abuses often serve personal or voyeuristic urges. For example, an internal IRS audit documented over 1,500
instances from 1994 to 1995 in which employees browsed "the confidential tax records of friends, relatives, and celebrities."2 84 Similarly, a New
York City police officer was convicted of accessing the National Criminal Information System to compile dossiers on women as he sought a

276.
See generally Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1482 (discussing risks of data retention and recognizing that the mere
existence of a database creates risks from "government investigators, private litigants, data thieves,
and commercial parties").
277.
See supra Part V.A.
Spencer, supra note 251, at 886-90 (discussing historical abuses of personal information
278.
in government and in the private sector).

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See id. at 889-90.
Id. at 889 & n.264.
Id. at 889.
Id.
Id. at 890.
Id.
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potential victim to kidnap. 28 5 That story is one of a number of recent corruption cases in which NYPD officers were accused of using the NCIC
database to "cyber snoop on co-workers, tip off drug dealers, stage robberies and-most notoriously-scheme to abduct and eat women." 2 86
The NSA is not immune from these types of abuses, as evidenced
by the NSA's recent "LOVEINT" scandal. The term LOVEINT is a play
on the NSA's practice of abbreviating different types of intelligenceSIGINT for signals intelligence and HUMINT for human intelligence. 2 87
The NSA revealed in August 2013 that its employees "had violated privacy rules on nearly 3,000 occasions in a one-year period." 28 8 These violations involved overseas communications. Typically, employees were
289
spying on a partner or spouse.
The Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection program suffered from substantial misuse almost from its inception. FISC Judge
Reggie Walton noted in March 2009 that, for the prior two-and-a-half
years, the NSA had searched all incoming metadata using an "alert list"
of identifiers potentially associated with terrorists.290 But that alert list
had been created for another purpose, and almost 90% of the numbers on
the list did not meet the "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard that
governed the Section 215 collection program.291 In addition, as a result of
inadequate training, "31 NSA analysts had queried the [business records]
metadata during a five day period in April 2008 'without being aware
they were doing so."' 29 2 These "accidental" queries relied on 2,373 foreign telephone identifiers for which there had been no prior determination of reasonable articulable suspicion.293 Judge Walton concluded that
the minimization procedures had been "so frequently and systematically
violated that it can fairly be said that this critical element of the overall
[business records] regime has never functioned effectively."294
In light of these vulnerabilities, any predictive surveillance program
must make security a top priority. The President's Review Group recommended improvements to the process of vetting personnel for security
clearances and improvements to the security classification system itself.2 95 And, perhaps in direct response to the Snowden disclosures, the
285.

Tom Hays, NYC Cases Show Crooked Cops' Abuse ofFBI Database, ASSOCIATED PRESS,

July 7, 2013.
286. Id.
287.

Gorman, supranote 250.

288. Id.
289.
Id.
In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL 9150913, at *2290.
4 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009).
291.

Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

292.
293.
294.

Id. at *4.
Id
Id. at *5.

295.

PRESIDENT'S REVIEw GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note

1, at 233-34.
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President's Review Group recommended that "security clearances should
be more highly differentiated, including the creation of 'administrative
access' clearances that allow for support and information technology
personnel to have the access they need without granting them unnecessary access to substantive policy or intelligence material."296
F. Security Against Data Breaches
The risk of external data breaches is undeniable. 2 97 Governments are
just as vulnerable to breaches as private organizations. Comprehensive
databases like the ones required for predictive surveillance could present
extremely attractive targets for hackers. The harms that can flow from
external breaches include identity theft, financial fraud, and emotional
distress.298 Breaches can occur when external agents hack into databases,
but they can also occur when insiders disclose data unintentionally-as
when an employee loses a laptop computer or USB drive 29 9 _OT intentionally-as when a systems analyst downloads top-secret, classified
documents, flees the country, and shares them with the global media. 3 0
Given these risks, no predictive surveillance program should be authorized unless the NSA secures its hardware, software, and procedures
against external threats. The President's Review Group recommended
that networks carrying classified data be equipped with programs that
"record network traffic for real time and subsequent review to detect
anomalous activity, malicious actions, and data breaches." 3 0' The group
also recommended that agencies expand their use of procedures that limit
employees' access to data for which they are specifically authorized. 302
G. Increased Oversight and Transparency
The prospect of a vast database containing information about every
citizen would raise serious public concerns about misuse and abuse of
power. Given our nation's history of intelligence abuses, the public will
be reluctant to accept such pervasive data collection without strong over-

296.

Id at 234.

297.

Brookman & Hans, supra note 251, at 2.

298.

Id

For example, the Department of Health and Human Services offers an online tool allow299.
ing the public to find notice of data breaches involving unsecured medical information affecting over
500 people. See Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES OFF. FOR Civ. RTS., https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breachreport.jsf (last visited
Feb. 12, 2015). A search for breaches involving lost or stolen laptops reveals scores of breaches in
2013, the top two of which affected a combined 1.5 million people. For a comprehensive and
searchable chronology of data breaches, see Chronology ofData Breaches Security Breaches 2005Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach/ (last updated

Dec. 31, 2013).
300.
301.

See, e.g., Greenwald et al., supra note 250.
PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note

1, at 247-48.
302.
Id. at 248.
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sight by the other branches of government and without enough transparency to allow the public to know that the program is working properly.
The first step toward both oversight and transparency would be to
introduce a public advocate into the FISA system. Currently, FISA requires that proceedings before the FISC are ex parte so the FISC hears
only from the government. 30 3 The President's Review Group found that,
when FISA was first enacted, Congress assumed that the FISC "would
resolve routine and individualized questions of fact, akin to those involved when the government seeks a search warrant." 3 0 Since 1978,
however, changes in law and technology have presented challenging and
novel issues that would benefit from the adversarial system that is the
norm in American courts. 305
The President's Review Group recommended, therefore, that Congress amend FISA to include a Public Interest Advocate who would appear before the FISC.306 Similarly, Congressman Adam Schiff has introduced legislation that would require the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB) to appoint attorneys to serve as public interest
advocates before the FISC.307 The proposed legislation would also require the PCLOB to appoint "technical experts" to advise the advocates
on issues likely to arise in FISA cases, such as "computer networks, telecommunications, encryption, and cybersecurity." 308 And the proposed
legislation would require that the FISC appoint a privacy advocate in
"any matter before a covered court involving a significant interpretation
or construction of a provision of this Act, including any novel legal, factual, or technological issue or an issue relating to the Fourth Amendment."30 9
Predictive surveillance programs by their nature would pose significant risks to privacy and civil liberties. Accordingly, independent advocates should represent the public interest by testing the government's
initial data collection application and proposed methodology, as well as
the government's subsequent petitions to conduct surveillance based on
its findings.
§

1805(a) (2012) (referencing ex parte orders).

303.

50 U.S.C.

304.

PRESIDENT'S REVIEw GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note

I, at 203.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id at 202-03.
Ensuring Adversarial Process in the FISA Court Act, H.R. 3159, 113th Cong. (2013).
Id. at § 2(a)(1)(D).

309.
Id. at § 2(b)(i)(1). There are other proposed solutions as well. For example, Representative
Steven Lynch introduced the Privacy Advocate General Act of 2013, which would establish an
Office of the Privacy Advocate General in the Executive branch and would allow the Chief Justice
and the senior Associate Justice to jointly appoint the Privacy Advocate General for seven-year
terms. H.R. 2849, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2013). For a discussion of potential constitutional issues
surrounding the appointment of a public advocate, see ANDREw NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43260, INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE INTO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT'S COURTS: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES passim (2013).
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Second, the FISC's decisions should be made public so that Congress and the people could consider how the FISC was interpreting a
predictive surveillance program. During the Patriot Act reauthorization
debate in 2011, Senator Ron Wyden tried and failed to attach an amendment forcing the Attorney General to disclose the government's secret
interpretation of Section 215, the business records provision.3 10 Instead,
the government's broad interpretation of relevance in Section 215 remained secret until the administration's declassification of certain FISC
decisions in the wake of the Snowden disclosures. 3 To avoid such unpleasant surprises, FISC opinions should be made public, redacted as
necessary to protect national security. 3 12 Obviously there will be highly
sensitive information that must be redacted. Otherwise, the FISC opinions should be released to the public. We have seen the declassification
and public disclosure of over twenty-five FISC orders in the wake of the
Snowden disclosures.313 Some have been heavily redacted, but the redactions appear sensible-such as redacting information about the selectors
that the NSA can use to query the database. 314 These releases suggest that
FISC opinions could be routinely redacted as needed and released to the
public.
Third, the program should require frequent and detailed reporting to
Congress. As described above, most members of Congress were not informed of the details of the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata program until it became public.3 15 A predictive surveillance program must
never be allowed to operate under Congress's radar. The disclosures
must be sufficiently detailed to enable Congress to balance the program's
benefits against the threat to civil liberties. Relevant details would include the numbers of individual records collected, the types of predictive
analytics employed, the results of each instance of data analysis,3 16 the
number of targeted searches that were conducted as a result of the data
analysis, the outcomes of investigations in which those targeted searches
were used, and the extent to which the predictive analytics played a role
in those outcomes.

310.
Spencer Ackerman, There's a Secret PatriotAct, Senator Says, WIRED (May 25, 2011,
4:56 PM), www.wired.com/2011/05/secret-patriot-act.
311.
Ellen Nakashima & Carol D. Leonnig, DeclassificationofFISC Document Being Urged,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2013, at A05.
312.
The President's Review Group recommended declassification reviews of FISC opinions.
PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supranote 1, at 201.
313.
IC
on
the
Record,
OFF.
OF
THE
DIR.
OF
NAT'L
INTELLIGENCE,
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/tagged/declassified (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (releasing selected
court documents, testimony, and position papers relating to activities of the intelligence community).

314.
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Finally, to maximize the opportunity for legislative oversight and
give the people an ongoing voice in the process, legislation authorizing a
predictive surveillance program should require frequent reauthorization.3 17 The prospect of reauthorization would ensure periodic debate and
would give the intelligence community a strong incentive to be as forthcoming as possible in order to persuade Congress of the merits of reauthorization. The most recent authorization of the Section 215 program
was a four-year authorization. 318
CONCLUSION

There is nothing new about predictive analytics. The techniques
have been in use for years in the private and public sectors. But the government uses to date have involved data already in the government's
hands. What the NSA's bulk surveillance programs added to the picture
was the government's potential to collect and store pervasive data on a
global scale. Although bulk collection may face technological and political obstacles today, those obstacles likely will not last forever. When the
government gains the technological ability and political will, we will
face a new model of predictive surveillance-a model that may have
potential benefits but that poses a tremendous threat to privacy.
To mitigate the privacy threat while still yielding the potential benefits, we will need a new regulatory scheme. Because the first step of predictive surveillance will be to collect all the data, we cannot rely on the
traditional first step of having the judge assess the justification for the
government's targeting decision. Instead, the judge must ensure that the
data collection and analysis are supported by a scientifically valid theory,
and the people must have their privacy interests represented by a public
advocate during this stage. Beyond these two new features, the remaining
elements of the regulatory scheme are merely very stringent versions of
existing regulatory schemes that involve rigorous independent oversight
and transparency.
If predictive surveillance ever demonstrates real potential to deter
terrorism, it is difficult to imagine the courts holding that predictive surveillance cannot be constitutional under any circumstances. Recognizing
that reality, this Article offers a narrow theory on which predictive surveillance might comply with the Fourth Amendment. Relying on the
Keith case and the special needs cases will allow courts to draw a line
between antiterrorism efforts and the inevitable attempts to expand the
predictive surveillance uses to ordinary law enforcement needs. The special needs aspect of this Article's approach would also translate well to
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government data collection efforts on a local scale, rather than a global
one. For example, systems of automated license plate readers might be
constitutional when used for purposes such as collecting tolls and monitoring traffic patterns. However, the programs would exceed their constitutional mandate if government sought to expand them to ordinary law
enforcement investigations. Given the reality that courts are unlikely to
strike down suspicionless data collection programs in their entirety, this
Article's narrow and pragmatic approach may offer the best course to
protecting privacy.

